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Rhetoric, Reality, and the Law of
Unfunded Federal Mandates
by
Daniel H. Cole and Carol S. Corner
"Unfunded mandates" were a
major issue in the 1994 Regar
congressional elections. In
rhetoric reminiscent of Ronald constiti
Reagan's New Federalism,
candidates around the country politicali
lashed out against the federal
government's "undisciplined federal ma
appetite" for regulating with "other
governments' hard-earned is no evi
money.'" They brandished those m
impressive-looking surveys and
studies to support their claim that imposing
"unfair" federal regulatory
"burdens" were driving states and state a
cities toward "bankruptcy." 2 State
and local leaders declared a gover
National Unfunded Mandates Day,
and they staged made-for-media
protests to publicize the event.' The press seized on the
sound-bites, without bothering to explore the facts.
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Banner headlines proclaimed,
"WASHINGTON BUCK-
PASSING COSTING STATES,
CITIES, TAXPAYERS
DEARLY,' 4  and "MODERN-
DAY TAXATION WITHOUT
REPRESENTATION."'  This
combustive rhetoric fueled the
emergence of the unfunded
mandates issue as a national
political priority, and it helped
usher into Congress a new
Republican majority with a
"mandate" to curb mandates.
Immediately following the
1994 elections, then-Senate
Majority Leader Bob Dole
announced that the 104th Senate's
first act would be "to relieve states
from unfunded federal mandates."6 Indeed, Senate Bill 1
was entitled the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995.
Meanwhile, the Republican leadership in the House of
Representatives severed the unfunded mandates issue
from the Contract with America ("the Contract") in order
to act on it even more quickly than the rest of the
Contract.7 The 1995 Unfunded Mandates Reform Act
(UMRA) became the second statute enacted by the 104th
Congress. President Clinton signed it into law on March
22, 1995.'
Given the expedited treatment it received, the
UMRA is surprisingly modest. The statute does not
require the Congress to repeal, or even review, existing
unfunded federal mandates.9 Nor does it prevent the
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federal government from imposing new regulatory
burdens on state and local governments. The statute does
require Congress to quantify the costs to local and state
governments of some new mandates it imposes; for many
(but not all) intergovernmental mandates costing more
than $50 million, Congress must either identify a federal
funding stream or approve the unfunded mandate in a
separate, recorded vote."0 Administrative agencies also
must prepare "regulatory impact statements" for proposed
regulations that would impose costs of more than $100
million in any one year on local governments or the
private sector." These provisions could reduce the
number of unfunded federal mandates and enhance
congressional oversight of agency decisionmaking. The
result could be better, though not necessarily fewer,
federal mandates to state and local governments.
If the federal government wants to issue new
mandates, it will not have to look hard for funding
streams. Ironically, state and city coffers are filled with
federal funds that are, as yet, untied to specific federal
mandates. But how can that be if, as the rhetoric
maintains, federal unfunded mandates are bleeding cities
and states dry? Simply put, the reality does not support
the rhetoric. According to the best available numbers,
total federal subsidies to local governments substantially
exceed the total estimated costs of federal regulations. 2
Recent articles have focused on the constitutionality
and policy implications of unfunded federal mandates. 3
This article has a different goal: to expose a central myth
behind the push for federal mandate relief. Regardless of
the constitutional or political propriety of federal
mandates, there is no evidence that those mandates are
imposing net costs on state and local governments. On
the contrary, federal subsidies to most cities and states,
including block grants, categorical grants, and tax
subsidies, more than compensate for the total estimated
cost of federal mandates, funded as well as unfunded. In
other words, the funding issue, which has been at the
center of the federal mandates debate, is a red herring,
and sweeping arguments about the fiscal unfairness of
federal mandates are misguided. Critics of federal
mandates must, instead, argue the messier political merits
of specific federal requirements.
Section I of this article presents the rhetoric of
unfunded mandates and subjects it to a reality check. One
central premise of the mandates "problem"-that the
federal government is imposing unfair costs on state and
local governments-turns out to be a myth. Section I
concludes with some implications of this analysis for
federal policymakers and judges.
Section II examines the UMRA and its legislative
history, and Section III reviews the Act's first year of
implementation. Our final assessment of the UMRA is
positive, because it should: (1) improve the legislative
process by increasing the information available to
legislators about the costs of the intergovernmental
mandates they enact, (2) enhance political accountability
by requiring a separate vote for many new mandates, and
(3) improve congressional oversight of administrative
agency actions. We doubt, however, that the UMRA will
have a significant, long-term affect on the number of new
federal intergovernmental mandates. Nonetheless, state
and local governments should be satisfied so long as the
federal government provides them with a net subsidy.
I. THE RHETORIC AND THE REALITY OF
UNFUNDED MANDATES
A. ORIGINS OF THE "PROBLEM"
The phrase "federal mandate" refers to a regulation
or regulatory burden imposed by the federal government
on a state or local government. 4 The federal mandate
"problem" actually encompasses several issues, including
increasing federal "red tape," declining federal aid to
states and municipalities, increasing state responsibility
for federal regulatory programs, and the comparative
political accountability of officials at various levels of
government. 5 Before Congress enacted the UMRA in
1995, the phrase "unfunded mandates" appeared in a
number of different contexts, 6 ranging from general
issues of intergovernmental relations to the merits of
specific federal regulations. 7
Federal-state relations have always been
contentious. Before the 1930s, those relations were based
on constitutional delegation, premised on a system of dual
federalism. 8 During the New Deal era, federal-state
relations became primarily a political (or fiscal), rather
than a constitutional, issue. The federal government
became more involved in state and local activities, but it
was viewed more as a provider than a boss. Federal aid
more than paid for the small number of local programs
enacted as part of the Roosevelt Administration's New
Deal, 9 and local governments could devote surplus
federal funds to local programs.20
During the 1960s and 1970s, intergovernmental
relations grew increasingly strained, as Congress enacted
more than 500 new federal regulatory programs affecting
state and local governments. Many of these programs
promoted noble social goals, ranging from clean drinking
water to freedom from racial discrimination, but they
came with detailed rules, bureaucracies, and formulas for
matching and distributing funds.2' Even more
importantly, they came without direct federal funding;
state and local administrative authorities had to pay the
bulk of the costs out of their own budgets.
The strain on state and city coffers was offset,
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however, by federal "General Revenue Sharing"-all-
purpose grants with no conditions attached.' During the
1970s, federal grants to state and local governments
quadrupled.' By 1978, federal grants to cities equaled
26% of the revenue cities raised themselves and 70% of
the revenue they received from their states.24 Federal
grants to eleven big cities, including Detroit, Phoenix,
Los Angeles, Tulsa, Rochester, Chicago, Boston, St.
Louis, Cleveland, Houston, and New York, averaged
43.3% of city tax revenues.' For some cities, including
St. Louis, Newark, Buffalo, Cleveland, and Boston,
federal aid averaged 57.3% of own-source revenues.26
Most federal grants-in-aid at that time were in the form of
"General Revenue Sharing." Thus, the federal funds were
completely fungible.
The flow of federal dollars to state and local
governments slowed when the Reagan Administration
took office in 1980. Between 1978 and 1988, the federal
contribution to state and city outlays fell to only eighteen
percent.2' These aid reductions came as the number of
federally-imposed mandates continued to rise. As a
result, the net federal subsidy to cities and states declined.
But-this point is critical-it remained a net subsidy.
In addition, while the Reagan Administration did not
curtail the imposition of new federal mandates, it reduced
the burden for state and local governments (if only
temporarily). First, it slowed the pace of new mandates,
especially environmental mandates. Second, it effectively
reduced the costs of existing federal mandates by relaxing
federal oversight and enforcement. In the early 1980s, for
example, Congress slashed the federal Environmental
Protection Agency's budget by more than thirty percent
(from $1.4 billion in 1981 to $975 million in 1983).2" As
a result, in 1983 the EPA was forced to reduce its staff of
enforcement attorneys from 200 to only 30.29 The
Reagan EPA had little choice but to adopt voluntary
compliance and the "nonconfrontational approach" as its
official enforcement policies."
In the last years of the Reagan Administration,
federal funding to state and local governments increased
again, but not nearly to late-1970s levels, and it came
with more strings attached. General Revenue Sharing
was replaced by Categorical Grants and Block Grants,
which provided less discretion to recipient governments.
But the lost discretion was only marginal. The strings
attached to Block Grants, in particular,. tend to be quite
loose." They are still substantially fungible in that they
can offset own-source revenues dedicated to complying
with federal mandates. Still, the marginal loss of
discretion in the use of federal grant funds may be one
factor driving current state and city complaints about
federal mandates.
The phrase "unfunded mandates" first appeared in
the late 1970s, when the rate of increase in federal
intergovernmental mandates began to outpace the rate of
increase in federal grants to state and local governments. 2
During the Reagan years, state and local governments had
to bear more of the costs of the existing programs as well
as new federally-mandated programs. This exacerbated
existing fiscal pressures and generated political tension,
giving impetus to the unfunded mandates debate.
"Unfunded mandates" became a "shorthand phrase that
sums up the tensions and grievances of the federal system
characterized by deficits at the national level, and by
budget shortfalls, increased taxes, and service cutbacks at
the State and local levels. 33
In 1979 the Joint Economic Committee of Congress
attempted, for the first time, to define and quantify the
federal regulatory burden on state and local
governments.34  But like all subsequent studies of the
unfunded mandates "problem," it failed to assess the total
costs of federally-imposed mandates in light of federal
intergovernmental grants and subsidies. As a result, the
study provided no grounds for concluding that federal
mandates were imposing net costs on state and local
governments. The same was true of a 1980 study
conducted by the Urban Institute that estimated the gross
costs of six federal mandates on seven jurisdictions. 5
While the study derived a total per capita cost of $25 (in
1978 dollars), the study's authors admitted that the costs
of federal mandates varied drastically from one
jurisdiction to another.36  They also did not offset the
costs of federal mandates against fungible grants-in-aid. 7
Nevertheless, these early studies elicited prompt, if weak,
legislative responses.
In 1980, Congress enacted two laws, the Paperwork
Reduction Acte8 and the Regulatory Flexibility Act,39
which were designed not to prevent or reduce federal
mandates, but to decrease compliance costs. A more
significant law was enacted in 1981, entitled the State and
Local Government Cost Estimate Act. ° Like the 1995
UMRA, this statute required the Congressional Budget
Office to prepare cost estimates for all federal mandates
on state and local governments in pending legislation.4'
However, unlike the 1995 UMRA, the 1981 Act did not
erect any procedural hurdles to the enactment of new
federal mandates.42 While it undoubtedly increased the
information available to federal legislators about the costs
of mandates they imposed on state and local
governments, the 1981 State and Local Government Cost
Estimate Act ultimately had no impact on the number of
federal mandates. By the late 1980s, the unfunded
mandates issue rose again to the fore of public policy
debates, as new studies appeared to prove that
proliferating federal mandates were pushing state and
local governments toward bankruptcy:
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B. PROVING A MYTH: SURVEYS AND STUDIES OF THE
UNFUNDED MANDATES "PROBLEM"
In 1988, the City of Columbus, Ohio, issued the
third major report on the unfunded mandates "problem."43
This report gave new energy to the anti-mandate
movement and sparked other local and state government
studies. These studies, which received widespread media
attention, provided much of the evidentiary basis for the
Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995. At first glance,
the state and local government studies look impressive.
They appear to show that unfunded federal mandates are
unfairly taxing state and local resources. But appearances
can be, and in this case are, deceiving. On a careful
reading, the state and local government reports prove to
be at best uninformative, and at worst misleading. Most
significantly, not one of the reports examines whether the
total costs of federal mandates exceed total federal
subsidies to state and local governments. In the absence
of that comparison, the studies and reports cannot
possibly "prove" that the federal government is imposing
"unfair" burdens on state and local governments and their
taxpayers.
This subsection critically examines the largest and
most significant of the state and local unfunded mandates
studies, each of which suffers from significant flaws. We
supplement the information they contain with Commerce
Department and Office of Management and Budget
(OMB) statistics on federal subsidies to state and local
governments. The available numbers do not provide a
complete picture of intergovernmental fiscal relations, but
they do permit a rough comparison of the federally-
provided subsidies and federally-imposed mandates
(funded and unfunded). Federal grants-in-aid appear to
substantially exceed the estimated costs of federal
mandates, providing a net (after mandates) subsidy to
state and local governments.
1. The Ohio Studies
The State of Ohio has been at the center of the
unfunded mandates controversy since 1988, when its
State and Local Government Commission conducted a
survey entitled An Overview of the Mandate Problem and
Recommendations for Ohio." This report dealt mainly
with state mandates to local governments, and it led to the
enactment of state legislation regulating state-imposed
unfunded mandates in May of 1994.45 At about the same
time, Ohio's governor issued an Executive Order to
further control state mandates to local governments.46
The Executive Order created a task force to study
outdated and inappropriate state mandates and to assess
the impact of proposed state agency rules on local
governments.47
The State and Local Government Commission of
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Ohio issued a second report in 1994 that addressed both
state and federal mandates.4" The report identified
seventy-six laws containing unfunded mandates, eleven
of which were federal requirements that state regulators
had passed through to local governments.49 The report
also contained a survey of county, township, and
municipal officials to determine which federal mandates
were the most burdensome to local governments. The
survey results listed the federal mandates and the number
of times each mandate was identified by surveyed
officials.5" Of twenty-two identified federal mandates,
twelve were related to environmental protection."
However, the survey did not require or even request local
government officials to provide financial information to
substantiate their claims about the burdens imposed by
these "unfunded mandates." Consequently, the report
provided no gross and net cost estimates for listed federal
mandates.
The report did, however, quote from an earlier State
of Ohio study that estimated that the total annual cost of
unfunded federal mandates to the state exceeded $300
million.52  Although this figure is almost certainly
inflated,53 it does provide a useful starting point for
assessing the true "burden" of unfunded mandates on the
State of Ohio. However, cost estimates tell only half the
story. In order to accurately assess the burden of federal
mandates, we also need to know how much federal
funding the state received. There are many ways to fund
a mandate. Even without direct funding, a mandate might
be funded indirectly, for instance, by discretionary federal
grants-in-aid.54
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, in
1994 the State of Ohio received approximately $8.4
billion in federal grants, more than S3 billion of which
were discretionary.55 Apparently the State of Ohio
received ten times more federal discretionary dollars than
it was required to spend on all "unfunded" federal
mandates, since the state's own estimates show federal
mandates cost only $300 million.56 This figure may be
misleading, however, because discretionary dollars (since
the demise of General Revenue Sharing) always come
with strings attached; they cannot offset federal mandate
costs dollar-for-dollar. A more accurate computation
would require a more complete cost estimate of mandate
costs, available funds, and restrictions on fund uses. The
net burden or benefit imposed on the State of Ohio by the
federal government is the total cost of federal mandates,
both funded and unfunded, minus total federal subsidies
received, including grants and tax subsidies. But the
Ohio studies do not provide the information necessary to
compute the net burden (or benefit). The numbers they
do provide only permit us to conclude that in 1994 Ohio
received from the federal government $8.1 billion more
STANFORD LAW & POLICY REVIEW
RHETORIC, REALITY, AND THE LAW OF UNFUNDED FEDERAL MANDATES
than it was forced to spend on unfunded federal
mandates.
2. The Chicago Study
In 1992, the City of Chicago and the Roosevelt
University Institute for Metropolitan Affairs prepared
another report on unfunded mandates."7 This sheds more
light on the issues than the Ohio studies because it
includes more detailed financial information that, on close
examination, appears to contradict the City's contentions
about the "burdens" of unfunded federal mandates. What
remains, in the end, is only bald rhetoric about federalism
and "the direct connection between the individual citizen
and his or her government that the American federal
system was created to enhance."5 8
The Chicago report claims that federal mandates
consume local tax revenues: "[L]ocal governments and
taxpayers are now dipping well into local revenue sources
to foot the bill for federal programs." 9 But the financial
data provided in the report belie this contention. The
Chicago report estimates that "unfunded mandates and
burdensome regulations cost . . . a conservatively-
estimated $160 million."' But the report also reveals that
the federal government contributes $519 million each
year to the City's budget.6' Accepting both numbers at
face value, Chicago apparently receives over three times
more money from the federal government than it is forced
to spend on "unfunded mandates and burdensome
regulations."
3. The Tennessee Study
The State of Tennessee issued a report in 1995 that
yielded findings similar to those of the Chicago Study.62
The study estimated that federal mandates (funded and
unfunded)63 cost the state $244.2 million in budget year
1995-96. But the study also reported that federal aid to
Tennessee was expected to total $4.08 billion dollars.'
Not all of this federal aid is discretionary, of course, but a
sizable chunk of it is. In 1994, for example, thirty-nine
percent of the $3.9 billion in federal grants Tennessee
received-S1.5 billion-was discretionary.' That is
more than six times the estimated total cost of federal
mandates in Tennessee's 1995-96 budget year. Of
course, comparing federal discretionary funds to mandate
costs is meaningful only if discretionary funds are
somehow fungible for mandate purposes. Later in this
section, we will see that they are substantially fungible.
4. The U.S. Conference of Mayors/Price Waterhouse
Study
In 1992 and 1993, the U.S. Conference of Mayors
surveyed 314 local governments about unfunded federal
mandates and hired the accounting firm of Price
Waterhouse to tabulate the results. It was the largest
survey to date of unfunded federal mandate costs, and its
findings, published in October 1993, appear impressive."
According to Price Waterhouse's computations, the ten
most expensive federal unfunded mandates cost American
cities $6.5 billion in 1993.67 This total estimate is the sum
of estimates provided by the 314 cities that participated
in the survey. However, while the data seem striking,
they have little utility because of numerous and
substantial methodological flaws in the survey.
The U.S. Conference of Mayors/Price Waterhouse
study attempts to derive generally applicable inferences
based on survey data obtained from a sample. Inferential
statistics rely on mathematical theories of probability to
make generalizations about populations based on data
from samples. 8 In order to draw the desired inference
with a high degree of accuracy, the sample must be
representative of the whole population, and the data must
be accurate. 9 This process can yield highly accurate
inferences if it is done properly. However, the inferences
drawn from the U.S. Conference of Mayors/Price
Waterhouse study are not reliable, because the process
was flawed.
The U.S. Conference of Mayors/Price Waterhouse
study attempts to infer a total cost estimate of unfunded
federal mandates for all U.S. cities from a sizable sample
of 314 cities. But the sample is not representative of all
U.S. cities. Smaller cities (defined by the survey as those
with fewer than 30,000 inhabitants) are under-represented
in the data pool because they responded to the survey less
frequently than larger cities."0 In addition, the study fails
to reveal whether the sample includes every city that
responded to the survey or a select group of respondents.
While the survey's size is respectable, its
representativeness is questionable.
The survey data are also questionable. The U.S.
Conference of Mayors/Price Waterhouse study claims
that survey data were verified (without explaining how),7
but subsequent independent assessments have turned up
numerous significant discrepancies. For example, the
U.S. Conference of Mayors/Price Waterhouse study
claims that 234 of the 314 surveyed cities incurred costs
under the Endangered Species Act (ESA).7' This figure
made the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) suspicious
because there are no known endangered species in or
around many of those cities. To test the data, EDF
solicited copies of survey responses directly from
participating cities. Of the eight cities that provided their
survey responses to the EDF, only one reported ESA-
related costs. But the U.S. Conference of Mayors/Price
Waterhouse study listed all eight as having reported costs
under ESA mandates. The staff of the Senate
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Environment and Public Works Committee discovered
other discrepancies.7 They found that the study
mistakenly listed at least two cities (Norman, Oklahoma
and Jackson, Mississippi) as having incurred costs under
legislation including the Clean Air Act, the Clean Water
Act, the Endangered Species Act, and the Fair Labor
Standards Act.74
These discrepancies alone refute the claim that the
U.S. Conference of Mayors and Price Waterhouse
verified the data contained in the study. Moreover, it
would have been impossible to verify much of the data in
the study because the study did not require respondents to
identify information sources or to supply supporting
records.7" When the staff of the Senate Environment and
Public Works Committee interviewed survey respondents,
only twenty-two percent of them "could provide
documents to verify the cost estimates they provided to
Price Waterhouse. 76
Even if all the survey data had been both verifiable
and actually verified, the figures extrapolated from that
data still would not provide a true picture of the costs of
federal mandates. The chosen extrapolation method does
not "adjust for significant confounding factors,"7 such as
cost differentials resulting from, among other causes,
variations in local pollution levels. Compliance costs
under the Clean Air Act, for example, are determined
largely by local pollution levels. According to the Staff
Report of the Senate Environment and Public Works
Committee, the City of New York, which was included in
the survey, led the nation in 1992 with 304 moderate air
pollution days.78 Meanwhile, Honolulu, which was not
included in the survey, had only three moderate air
pollution days.79 Yet, "using Price Waterhouse's method
of extrapolation, costs attributable to cities with heavily-
polluted air, such as New York and Los Angeles, would
influence the extrapolation of costs to an overall
population including Honolulu, which has virtually no air
pollution."' Similarly, the costs of complying with water
supply mandates in Philadelphia, "which has the nation's
worst record for violations of the Safe Drinking Water
Act and the highest annual number of people exposed to
dangerous contaminants," would be used to project
compliance costs for other cities not included in the
survey, such as Minneapolis, which has "no drinking
water violations."8'
The U.S. Conference of Mayors/Price Waterhouse
study also fails to offset mandate cost estimates against
federal and state aid received, representing yet another
methodological flaw. In addition, the study fails to
consider that some of the costs cities incurred in
complying with federal mandates would have been
incurred even in the absence of those mandates. Thus, the
U.S. Conference of Mayors/Price Waterhouse study fails
to present an accurate portrayal of the unfunded federal
mandates "problem." According to Senators John Chafee
(R-R.I.) and Max Baucus (D-Mont.), respectively the
majority and minority leaders on the Senate Environment
and Public Works Committee, the study is "more
accurately seen as a review of total compliance costs for
federal, state, and local requirements.' '"
C. ACCURATELY ASSESSING THE COSTS AND
BENEFITS OF FEDERAL MANDATES AND GRANTS
The U.S. Conference of Mayors/Price Waterhouse
study sheds no real light on the unfunded mandates
"problem." Merely reporting the estimated costs of
admittedly expensive federal programs is inflammatory-
expenses appear magnified when isolated from overall
state and city budgets. Indeed, the state and local studies
of unfunded federal mandates reviewed here all
misportray the costs of federal mandates in precisely the
same ways: They estimate the gross costs of federal
mandates, but not the net costs after offsetting for: (1)
state and local fiscal benefits resulting from federal
mandates, (2) federal grants and other subsidies, or (3) the
regulatory costs that would be incurred even in the
absence of federal mandates.
A recent Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report
illustrates how federal mandate cost estimates are inflated.
The report examines state and local government cost
estimates of the federal Safe Drinking Water Act 3 and
finds that the estimates are exaggerated primarily because
they fail to take into account the costs that state and local
governments would incur even in the absence of the
federal mandates.84 The CBO rationally assumes that
local governments would take some steps to protect
drinking water supplies in the absence of federal
regulations. The true cost, then, of federal mandates
under the Safe Drinking Water Act is the incremental cost
of federally-required water protection activities, that is,
the costs of federal requirements above those costs local
governments would incur anyway. 5 The CBO did not
even hazard a guess at that number, which must, after all,
be very difficult to measure. That does not mean,
however, it should be ignored. It is important to
recognize, at least, that cost estimates of federal mandates
are inflated unless they are offset by the costs that state
and local governments would incur even in the absence of
federal mandates.8 6
In addition to inflating the costs of federal mandates,
the various state and local government studies all fail to
offset costs against the federal grant revenues and
subsidies they receive. As we saw in our review of
various state and local government studies, the total level
of federal spending appears to exceed the total costs of
federally-imposed mandates. 7 National figures confirm
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this. The Chicago report quotes a Heritage Foundation
analyst who estimates the total annual cost to all states of
all federal mandates at $75 billion a year.8" Not all of
those mandates are unfunded, of course. 9 But even if
they were, the states still would be receiving a substantial
net subsidy from the federal government. According to
the Commerce Department, the federal government in
1994 provided a total of $210 billion in annual state aid,
$90 billion of which was discretionary." That leaves
states with a potential net (after federal mandate
expenses) surplus of $15 billion or more in discretionary
federal grants.
As previously noted, federal block grants and other
discretionary funds are not wholly fungible-they come
with certain strings attached and, therefore, do not
provide a dollar-for-dollar offset for federal mandates-
but they are substantially fungible. As David Hyman has
written:
The distinction between restricted and
unrestricted grants is somewhat artificial
because of the fungibility of money, which
means the money can be used for more than
one purpose. A grant, with or without
restrictions on the use of funds, frees local tax
monies that otherwise would be spent on
government-provided services. The receipt of
the grant could allow tax reductions that
benefit citizens of recipient communities. If
taxes are reduced as a result of the grant,
citizens can increase their consumption of
private goods and services beyond the amounts
that would be possible if they had to finance all
government-supplied goods and services
through locally raised tax revenue. In other
words, the funds may end up being used for
any purpose, even though they were intended
for a specific use.9
This is especially true where federal grants, even
with conditions attached, pay for state and local priorities,
such as law enforcement or community development.
And, to the extent that all federal grant monies are
fungible, they should be factored into federal mandate
cost assessments. This may be difficult, as fungibility
varies substantially from one federal program to the next,
depending on the conditions imposed on grant funds. It
might be useful to compare total federal subsidies with
total federal regulatory requirements as percentages of
city budgets. But first we would need clear definitions of
"federally induced costs"'  and federally-provided
benefits, and someone would have to actually collect the
data.
Without vouching for their accuracy, we can use
currently available estimates of costs and benefits to
concoct a rough comparison of federally-induced costs
and federally-provided benefits. Starting with federally-
imposed costs, the U.S. Conference of Mayors/Price
Waterhouse study estimated that federal mandates
consumed on average 11.7% of city budgets in fiscal year
1993.' 3 How does that compare with federally-provided
benefits? Despite the 28% decline in federal funding
between 1981 and 1990, federal dollars still comprised an
estimated 14.3% of local government revenues in 1991.
94
This leaves a 2.6% net subsidy. In fact, the net subsidy is
probably higher than that because, between 1991 and
1993, federal grants to state and local governments
increased by 26%, from $152 to $206.4 billion."
The net federal subsidy grows even larger if we
incorporate other federal intergovernmental subsidies
besides direct grants-in-aid. For example, section 103(a)
of the Internal Revenue Code exempts state and local
bond issues from federal taxation, effectively permitting
state and local governments to borrow at below-market
interest rates.96 In fiscal year 1995, the section 103(a)
exemption cost the federal government an estimated
$12.35 billion in lost revenue.97 This is not a federal
grant-in-aid, but it boils down to much the same thing; it
is a $12.35 billion federal transfer to states and cities with
no strings attached. This single tax subsidy covers one-
sixth of the total estimated costs of federal mandates
imposed on state and local governments ($75 billion).98
State and local governments also benefit indirectly from
section 164(a) of the Internal Revenue Code,99 which
allows taxpayers to deduct state and local tax payments
from income subject to federal taxation. While this
benefit accrues directly to taxpayers, it indirectly
subsidizes higher marginal state and local tax rates.
According to James St. George of the Brookings
Institution, "Washington in effect pays 40 percent of state
and local income and property taxes for the highest-
income taxpayers and lower shares for other
taxpayers."" Deductions of state and local tax payments,
together with exemptions for interest earnings on state
and local debts, cost the federal government an estimated
$66 billion in fiscal year 1994.1 And they are only two
of many indirect federal subsidies to state and local
governments.
None of this proves, of course, that the federal
government provides net subsidies to each state and city.
As already noted, the available numbers are incomplete
and questionable, and even the concepts of federally-
induced costs and federally-provided benefits are
ambiguous. In addition, we have been dealing only with
average costs and benefits using numbers for big cities;
the fiscal circumstances of individual cities, especially
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smaller towns, vary greatly. Nevertheless, the available
numbers lean strongly in the direction of an average net
federal subsidy; the total amount of federal monies
flowing to states and cities appears to substantially exceed
the total amount of monies state and cities are forced to
spend on federal priorities. At the very least, the numbers
do not support the contention that the federal government
is imposing net costs on state and (most) local
governments. What is the basis, then, for concluding that
unfunded federal mandates are imposing "unfair" burdens
on state and local governments?
Finally, all of the surveys and studies discussed in
this section are premised on the debatable notion that the
federal government should pay for each and every
regulatory requirement it imposes on state and local
governments. As noted earlier,' normative issues in the
unfunded mandates debate are beyond the scope of this
article. But it is worth noting that there are legitimate
economic, political, and legal grounds for arguing that
local governments (and, through them, local taxpayers)
should bear at least some of the costs of complying with
certain federal environmental, civil rights, and health and
safety regulations.0 3
D. SUMMATION AND IMPLICATIONS
State and local government officials have
complained continuously and vociferously that they are
the victims of an elaborate scam by the federal
government. By imposing unfunded mandates on cities
and states, they claim, the feds are receiving credit for
admittedly worthwhile programs, while evading the
political fallout for the tax hikes those programs
demand." 4 In this section, we have subjected the rhetoric
about the unfunded mandates "problem" to a reality
check which belies the central claim that unfunded federal
mandates are unfairly burdening state and local
governments. The available numbers simply do not
support the claim that federal mandates are bankrupting
city budgets and causing local taxpayers to bear the fiscal
burden of federal programs.
The various local and state government studies and
surveys of the unfunded mandates "problem" reviewed in
this section fail to show anything more than that the
escalating costs of federal mandates are leaving state and
local governments with smaller net federal subsidies. The
costs of federal programs have escalated in recent years,
while federal grants-in-aid (until about 1988) declined. 5
But the available numbers suggest that the federal
government has continued to provide a substantial net
subsidy to state and local governments. The proliferation
of unfunded federal mandates has reduced, but not
reversed that subsidy.
State and local governments complain that they have
had to raise taxes to meet the increased federal mandate
compliance costs, but their studies have failed to provide
evidence linking local tax increases to federal mandates.
Furthermore, given the evidence of a continuing net
federal subsidy to state and local governments, it is
doubtful that any such links exist. State and local
governments may have had to raise taxes to make up for
reductions in their net federal subsidies (resulting from
increasing federal mandates and declining federal grants),
but to the extent they still receive a net federal subsidy,
state and local governments cannot genuinely blame local
tax increases on federal mandates. On the contrary,
national taxpayers have been bearing the excess costs of
city programs via direct federal grants or indirect federal
subsidies. State and local government officials might in
fact be doing exactly what they accused federal legislators
of doing: unfairly passing off responsibility for raising
taxes. Political commentaries note that this would not be
the first time that state and local governments have
attempted to "blame their financial troubles on the
aggressiveness of higher governmental authority ...
Scapegoats are essential in politics, and the national
government is always a choice target."'" From this
perspective, state and local complaints about unfunded
federal mandates may be seen simply as part and parcel of
"the politics of getting."'
10 7
All this, admittedly, has little bearing on normative
arguments about the propriety of unfunded federal
mandates, but it does present the mandates issue in a very
different light. At the very least it suggests that the
funding issue should not be at the heart of any debate
about federal mandates.
Our analysis in this section also has implications for
the courts, where the unfunded mandates issue has
emerged in recent cases concerning intergovernmental
relations. In Printz v. United States,' for example, a
federal district court in Montana struck down a provision
of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act'09 that
required local law enforcement officers to perform
background checks to determine individuals' eligibility to
purchase handguns. In an opinion authored by Judge
Charles Lovell, the court held that the
"ascertainment/background check provision of the Act
exceeds the powers delegated to Congress and violates
the Tenth Amendment of the Constitution because it
substantially commandeers state executive officers and
indirectly commandeers the legislative processes of the
state to administer a federal program.""0  The court's
rationale focused heavily on the fact that Brady Act
mandates were unfunded:
More important, both CLEOs (chief law
enforcement officers) and state and local
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elected bodies are indirectly required to
allocate their resources to implement the Act
instead of using those resources to address
problems important to their constituents.
In addition, state and local governments are
also held accountable for the Act by being
conscripted into bearing the financial burden
for administering the Act, lessening their
ability to provide other services to their
citizens and leading to the appearance of
inefficiency."'
The court did not support these assertions with any
evidence of the costs to local law enforcement agencies of
Brady Act compliance. Neither did the court mention
offsetting federal grants-in-aid for state and local law
enforcement." 2 The district court in Printz swallowed
whole the rhetoric of the unfunded mandates "problem"
without bothering to examine its factual basis. The
court's carelessness was especially regrettable because its
comments about federal funding for the Brady Act
mandate were not necessary to its decision on the
constitutional issues at bar, which concerned the limits of
federal authority over state and local administrators.
Indeed, in Mack v. United States,"' another federal
district court managed to hold the same provisions of the
Brady Act unconstitutional without resorting to
unsubstantiated rhetoric about unfunded federal
mandates.
The unfunded mandate rhetoric accompanied the
Mack and Printz rulings on their consolidated appeal to
the Ninth Circuit." 4 Although Judge Canby's majority
opinion for the appellate panel did not mention cost issues
in Brady Act compliance, Judge Fernandez's dissenting
opinion did, noting that state officials were being
"ordered to become part of a federal gun control program
at the state's own expense.."". Finally, Printz v. United
States brought the unfunded mandates issue all the way to
the U.S. Supreme Court. During oral arguments on
December 3, 1996, Justice Scalia stated, "[i]t's easy to
impose an obligation on the states and then let them take
the heat for raising taxes."' 16  This comment from a
member of the country's highest court indicates just how
pervasive and influential the unsubstantiated rhetoric of
unfunded mandates has become.
II. FROM CAMPAIGN RHETORIC TO LAW:
THE UNFUNDED MANDATES REFORM ACT
OF 1995
The preceding section illustrated that the unfunded
mandates "problem" is based, in large part, on a mythical
picture of the federal government as a voracious and
uncontrollable monster consuming state and local budget
revenues. When it comes to legislation, however,
persuasive myths can be every bit as important as facts.
In the UMRA, Congress responded to the rhetoric
but never lost sight of the reality that state and local
governments receive a net federal subsidy. This is clear
from the Senate "findings" codified in section 106 of the
Act. Section 106(a)(1) provides that "the Congress
should be concerned about shifting costs from Federal to
State and local authorities and should be equally
concerned about the growing tendency of States to shift
costs to local governments."". 7 While this acknowledges
an unfunded mandates "problem," it reflects the reality of
a declining net federal subsidy to state and local
governments. More revealing is the Senate's second
finding in section 106(a)(2) of the Act: "cost shifting
from States to local governments has, in many instances,
forced local governments to raise property taxes or curtail
sometimes essential services..... Notice that this finding
expressly blames unfunded state mandates, but not
unfunded federal mandates, for local tax increases. The
lack of parallel construction in sections 106(a)(1) and
106(a)(2) implies that the Senate was aware that federal
mandates have not been responsible for driving up state
and local taxes. If this implication is correct,"9 the Senate
must have found its legislative task tricky. It had to
respond (or, at least, appear to respond) to the perceived
"problem" of unfunded federal mandates without denying
the reality of a net federal subsidy to state and local
governments. Whether or not this was a conscious effort,
the structure of the UMRA seems to reflect Congress's
effort to walk a tightrope between perception and reality.
The UMRA's express purpose is "to end the
imposition, in the absence of full consideration by
Congress, of Federal mandates on State, local, and tribal
governments without adequate Federal funding, in a
manner that may displace other essential State, local, and
tribal governmental priorities."'20 A Report of the House
Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
explained that the goal was to "ensur[e] that Congress and
the Executive Branch know and consider the impact of
legislative and regulatory proposals before acting on these
proposals.'' These statements of purpose are fully
consistent with the UMRA's substantive and procedural
contents.
The UMIRA is divided into four titles. Title I
addresses legislative proposals that would impose
mandates on state and local governments. Title II
imposes procedural requirements on federal agency
rulemaking. Title III permits Congress to review existing
federal statutes and regulations that impose regulatory
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burdens on state and local governments. And Title IV
limits judicial review of congressional and federal agency
actions, so that litigation does not delay important federal
actions.
A. POINTS OF ORDER AND OTHER PROCEDURAL
REQUIREMENTS FOR UNFUNDED MANDATES IN
PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Title I of the UMRA requires that congressional
committee reports on legislative proposals include
information concerning whether those proposals would
impose new federal mandates on state and local
governments or on the private sector.' The reports must
include all direct costs stemming from the federal
mandate, as well as any adverse impacts the mandate
might have on the competitive balance between the
private and public sectors. For legislative proposals that
impose mandates on state or local governments,
committee reports must provide additional funding
information. If the intergovernmental mandate will be
federally funded, the report must include information
concerning appropriations and how funding will be
allocated. If the mandate will not be fully funded, the
committee must fully explain why not and to what
extent. "
In order to assist congressional committees in
fulfilling these responsibilities, the UMRA requires the
Congressional Budget Office to estimate the direct costs
of intergovernmental mandates. If a legislative proposal
would impose direct costs exceeding $50 million, the
CBO Director must submit, to the responsible committee,
an estimate of the costs of complying with the mandate
and the amount of new budget authority necessary to
cover those costs. The Director also must prepare cost
estimates for some private sector mandates. If a
legislative proposal would impose mandates on the
private sector in excess of $100 million, the Director must
estimate the costs of private sector compliance as well as
increases in federal financial assistance needed to fund
private sector compliance. 24
If a bill comes to the floor containing an
intergovernmental mandate estimated to cost more than
$50 million, it is considered not "in order," which means
that any legislator can object to it by raising a point-of-
order with the Chair. 2 ' When a point-of-order is raised,
the mandate is automatically stricken from the bill unless
a majority votes to waive the point-of-order. 26 A vote to
waive the point-of-order operates as an express approval
of the unfunded mandate. It is important to note,
however, that the UMRA does not require any member to
raise a point-of-order against an unfunded mandate. If no
point-of-order is raised, the unfunded mandate can be
enacted into law without a separate vote. It is doubtful,
however, that any substantial unfunded mandate would
make it through Congress without at least one senator or
representative raising a point-of-order. If that did happen,
the likely implication would not be that UMRA
procedures had broken down, but that there was
unanimous support in Congress for the new mandate. In
short, the UMRA does not prohibit Congress from
enacting new unfunded mandates; it merely provides
procedural mechanisms to ensure informed
decisionmaking and enhance political accountability.
It is also important to remember that not every
unfunded mandate is subject to the UMRA's special
procedural rules. In addition to mandates costing under
$50 million, Congress expressly excluded seven
categories of mandates from the UMRA. These include
mandates that: (1) enforce constitutional rights; (2)
establish or enforce rights against discrimination; (3)
require compliance with accounting and auditing
procedures for federal grants; (4) provide emergency
assistance to state, local, or tribal governments; (5)
pertain to social security programs; (6) relate to national
security; or (7) are required to fulfill international treaty
obligations. 2 7  The President also may designate
"emergency legislation" to avoid the UMRA's procedural
rules. "'28
B. NEW AGENCY RULEMAKING PROCEDURES
Title II of the UMRA amends agency rulemaking
procedures to require administrators to assess the impacts
of proposed regulations on state, local, and tribal
governments.'29 Federal agencies must prepare regulatory
impact statements for all proposed rules that might cost
local governments or the private sector $100 million or
more (in the aggregate) in any one year. 30 The statement
must identify the federal law under which the rule is
being promulgated, 3 ' and it must be included in the
general notice of the proposed or final rulemaking. 32 The
statement must include a cost-benefit analysis and an
estimate of compliance costs. The cost-benefit analysis
quantifies the costs and benefits of the federal mandate to
the private sector or to state, local or tribal governments,
as well as the effects of the mandate on public health,
safety and the environment. The cost estimates are to
include future compliance costs, disproportionate
budgetary effects, and the effects of the mandate on the
national economy. 3 1 Cost-benefit analyses also are to
assess the extent to which federal resources are available
to carry out mandates.'34
In addition, when an agency proposes a new
mandate that would require a regulatory impact statement,
it must identify and consider alternatives to the proposed
regulation. The agency then must select "the least costly,
most cost-effective or least burdensome alternative that
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achieves the objectives of the rule," unless that alternative
is inconsistent with the law or the administrator publishes
(with the rule) an explanation of why that alternative is
inappropriate. 3 '
C. ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW OF EXISTING FEDERAL
MANDATES
Title III of the UMRA requires the Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) to
study "issues involved in calculating the total costs and
benefits to State, local and tribal governments of
compliance with Federal law."'3 6 The ACIR is to
investigate and recommend to Congress means for: (1)
providing governments with more flexibility in
complying with mandates, (2) reconciling conflicting or
inconsistent mandates, (3) terminating duplicative or
obsolete mandates, (4) temporarily suspending non-vital
mandates in order to relieve local governments' fiscal
straits, and (5) establishing common definitions and
compliance standards.'37 The ACIR should recommend
mandates for legislative review and identify ways to
mitigate any negative impacts that relief from
intergovernmental mandates might have on the private
sector.'38 The UMRA also charges the ACIR to monitor
federal court decisions imposing responsibilities on state,
local, or tribal governments beyond those imposed by
federal laws and regulations. 39
D. JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE UMRA
In the final title of the Act, Congress strictly limits
judicial review. Plaintiffs can sue under the UMRA only
when agencies fail to prepare a regulatory-impact
statement as required by section 202.140 Even failure to
prepare a statement does not give cause to stay, enjoin or
invalidate the agency rule. 4' Judicial review is not
available to enforce compliance with any other
substantive or procedural provision of the UMRA. 42
E. INITIAL ASSESSMENTS OF THE UMRA
Responses to the UMRA have been mixed. Some
consider the law a well-balanced solution to the unfunded
mandates problem.'43 Others argue, to the contrary, that it
is completely unresponsive to the problem; they view the
UMRA as a mere "placebo" which, at best, should do no
harm." More hostile critics have referred to the UMRA
as a "toothless" "hoax" that does not even deserve to be
called a "law."' 45 Most interestingly of all, many state
and local officials who pushed the hardest for unfunded
mandates reform have been virtually silent on the UMRA.
To the extent they have discussed it at all, they have
referred to the statute as a "first step," suggesting that
they believe it does not completely resolve the unfunded
mandates "problem."' 46 The UMRA's first year of
implementation has, to varying extents, borne out each of
these disparate viewpoints.
III. IMPLEMENTING THE UMRA: YEAR ONE
A. THE CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE GEARS UP
TO ASSESS NEW FEDERAL MANDATES
The UMRA generated a great deal of activity in the
Washington Beltway even before it took effect on January
1, 1996. In particular, the CBO and the ACIR were busy
complying or preparing to comply with their statutory
obligations under the Act.
The CBO's charge is to identify and calculate the
costs of new mandates in proposed legislation and
regulations. This task is pivotal, as CBO estimates alone
determine whether a given proposal is subject to the
UMRA's point-of-order vote. It is also a job that taxes
CBO resources. In an appearance before the Senate
Appropriations Committee in May 1996, CBO Director
June E. O'Neill estimated that the Agency's added
burdens under the UMRA would amount to $2.178
million and twenty-four staff-years in 1996 alone, based
on an expected workload of 550 bills to assess for
mandate costs. 4 7  These figures confirm that while
increasing the financial information for congressional
policymaking is a laudable goal, it is certainly not cheap.
In order to handle the expected influx of legislative
and administrative proposals for mandate cost estimates,
the CBO established a new State and Local Government
Cost Estimates Unit (SLGCEU) within its Budget
Analysis Division. The SLGCEU provides cost estimates
and conducts "special studies relating to
intergovernmental mandates and their budgetary
impacts"'48 in order to improve the accuracy of mandate
cost accounting. In July 1995, representatives of the
CBO asked members of the National Conference of State
Legislatures for assistance in collecting "more and better
information on the costs of its mandates."' 49 This may
have reflected, in part, the CBO's dissatisfaction with
existing state and local studies of federal unfunded
mandates, but it primarily demonstrated the CBO's desire
to improve its own cost estimations. Specifically, the
CBO wanted assistance in defining and isolating state and
local governments' incremental mandate compliance
costs (a problem identified in the CBO's study of federal
mandates under the Safe Drinking Water Act). ' The
CBO also wanted help to overcome the difficulties of
extrapolating and generalizing cost estimates across
states.' Five full-time CBO staff members assigned to
the SLGCEU perform mandate cost estimates and special
studies. 52  In the first half of 1996 alone, the unit
examined nearly 400 bills for intergovernmental and
private sector mandates. 5 3
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B. THE ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
INTERGOVERNMENT RELATIONS REVIEWS
EXISTING MANDATES
While the CBO geared up to perform its vital
function under the URMA, the ACIR was already
completing its initial review of existing federal mandates,
as required under Title III of the Act. The twenty-two
member Commission,' 4 comprised of state governors,
federal, state, and local legislators, and administration
officials, released its preliminary report and
recommendations on January 24, 1996.'55 The report
estimated that state and local governments are subject to
approximately 200 mandates under 170 federal laws. Of
those 200 mandates, the ACIR selected the fourteen
"most troublesome" for review. Based on that review, the
ACIR recommended permanently repealing
intergovernmental mandates contained in seven federal
laws: the Fair Labor Standards Act, 5 6 the Family and
Medical Leave Act, 5 7 the Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSHA),' drug and alcohol testing of commercial
drivers," 9  metric conversion for plans and
specifications," 6 the Boren Amendment to Medicaid,'
6
'
and required use of recycled crumb rubber in asphalt
paving. 162 None of these federal mandates, according to
the ACIR, have "sufficient national interest to justify
intruding on state and local government abilities to
control their own affairs."'
63
By contrast, the ACIR found sufficient national
interest to justify federal mandates under the Clean Water
Act,'" the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act,
61
and the Americans with Disabilities Act. 166 Nevertheless,
the ACIR recommended that the federal government
either pick up more of the tab for state and local
implementation of these statutes or relax stringent
requirements and deadlines for state and local compliance
with their mandates. 67  The remaining group of
mandates, under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 161 the
Endangered Species Act,'69 the Clean Air Act,170 and Acts
that condition federal grants-in-aid on compliance with
the Davis-Bacon Act,'7 ' were sufficiently justified by the
national interest, according to the ACIR, but the ACIR
recommended revising them to provide state and local
governments with "greater flexibility and increased
consultation."'' 72  In addition to these general
recommendations, the ACIR provided more specific and
detailed recommendations concerning each of the federal
laws reviewed. For example, the Commission
recommended that the federal government return to state
and local governments "full responsibility for safe
drinking water standards."' 73
C. CRITICISM OF THE ACIR REVIEW
At a news conference announcing the report and
recommendations, ACIR members invoked familiar
refrains about the federal government's propensity for
enacting noble goals while sticking state and local
taxpayers with the costs. As Representative Thomas M.
Davis III (R-Va.) put it, "'Congress passed the bill, then
passed the buck to state and local governments." ' 174 Such
inflammatory rhetoric created an impression that the
ACIR (despite its bipartisan composition) and its review
process were ideologically and politically biased.'
7 1
A report by Citizens for Sensible Safeguards (CSS),
a coalition of 150 labor, civil rights, community, and
environmental groups, 176 alleged that the ACIR's report
and recommendations were based on exaggerated costs,
understated benefits, and extensive methodological
flaws. 177 For example, in reviewing OSHA, the ACIR
neglected to consider the extensive fiscal benefits of
extending OSHA coverage to all public and private
employees. According to the CSS, state and local
governments would save an estimated $600 million
annually in reduced medical and workers' compensation
costs by complying with OSHA mandates. 7 1 Similarly,
in its review of the Family and Medical Leave Act, the
ACIR failed to consider existing empirical research that
derived lower net cost estimates. 79 Part of the ACIR's
problem, according to the CSS, was logistical: "How
[could] a staff of three [researchers] explore 200 proposed
mandates, select 14, and publish a set of well-researched
and coherent suggestions in less than one year?" ''8 In
addition, the CSS noted that the ACIR's review process
was closed-the group held no public meetings-and its
voting procedures were suspect." ACIR meetings were
plagued by absenteeism, and only seven ACIR members,
less than a quorum, were present at the December 19th
meeting to vote on the report and recommendations.
Other members of the ACIR were later balloted, but the
exact purpose of the vote was not clear. At the December
19th meeting, ACIR Executive Director William Davis
announced that, "the decisions [the Commission] make[s]
today are really on what it is that [the Commission]
want[s] to expose for public comment over the next three
months."'8 2  According to the CSS, "[c]ommissioners
never voted on the substance of the report. Rather, they
merely assented to have it published in the Federal
Register for comment."'8 3 This view was confirmed by at
least one member of the ACIR, Congressman Donald
Payne (D-N.J.), who complained that Commission
members were "not clear on exactly what they were
voting on."'8 4
Even after the ACIR released its preliminary report
and recommendations, it tried to subvert legally-required
administrative procedures. The UMRA directed the
Commission to hold "public hearings."' 85  The ACIR
initially scheduled a single for-profit "conference" for
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which it planned to charge participants $400 each.'86 This
effort was scuttled after public interest groups
complained. The ACIR then tentatively scheduled a free
public hearing, but provided only twelve days advance
notice in the Federal Register."7 That hearing was later
postponed indefinitely.' 8
The ACIR's recommendations also can be criticized
for exceeding the UMRA's mandate. As described in
section II of this article, Congress specified that the ACIR
was to base its review of existing mandates on five
factors: (1) providing state and local governments with
more flexibility in complying with federal mandates; (2)
reconciling conflicting or inconsistent mandates; (3)
terminating duplicative or obsolete mandates; (4)
temporarily suspending non-vital mandates in order to
relieve local governments' fiscal straits; and (5)
establishing common definitions and compliance
standards. 9 Arguably, the ACIR went well beyond these
directives in recommending the repeal of seven existing
federal mandates because they "do not have sufficient
national interest to justify intruding on state and local
government abilities to control their own affairs.""'
Nothing in the statutory directives instructed the ACIR to
make general policy recommendations about federal
mandates, though that is precisely what the ACIR did in
its report.
Specifically, the ACIR identified what it considered
to be "major problems common to most federal
mandates" and recommended the following fixes:
Costs. The federal government should assume some
share of mandate costs, both to restrain the extent of
the mandate and to help in identifying less-costly
compliance alternatives.
Public accountability. Federal laws should
recognize that state and local governments are led
by elected officials who are accountable to voters,
just as the President and members of Congress are.
Citizen lawsuits. Only the federal agency
responsible for enforcement of a law should be
permitted to sue state and local governments.
Small communities. Deadlines should be extended
and mandate requirements modified for very small
local governments.
Lack of federal coordination. A single federal
agency should be designated to coordinate each
mandate's implementation and to make binding
decisions about that mandate.' 9
With these policy prescriptions, the ACIR appears to
have changed from a government agency with a statutory
mission into an interest group advocating further
legislative action. The ACIR's policy prescriptions go
well beyond compliance with the UMRA; in fact, the
UMRA would have to be amended to implement them.
In addition to exceeding the UMRA's statutory
mandate, the ACIR's recommendations went beyond its
own staff's findings. For example, as already noted, the
ACIR recommended that the federal government turn
over to the states "full responsibility for safe drinking
water standards."'92 This goes well beyond the ACIR
staff's recommendations which called for "national public
health standards for drinking water," but state "imposition
and implementation."' 93  The Commission also went
beyond its own staff's recommendations in urging that
exemptions under the Endangered Species Act "be
applied more extensively to minimize social and
economic impact on state, local, and tribal
governments."'
194
It is important to remember that the ACIR itself
conducted no reviews of federal mandates above and
beyond its staff's working papers. By exceeding both its
statutory mandate and its own staff's recommendations,
the ACIR raises a serious question about its review
process for existing federal mandates: to what extent are
ACIR recommendations the products of thoughtful and
honest review, rather than mere political advocacy?
In view of the intense criticism that met its draft
recommendations, on July 9, 1996, the ACIR released a
revised draft that reversed course on many of its original
recommendations.' 95 For example, where the initial draft
recommendations had called on Congress to repeal
intergovernmental mandates in the Family and Medical
Leave Act, the revised draft recommended that Congress
"[rjetain state and local government coverage under the
Family and Medical Leave Act.'" 96 Where the initial draft
recommended repeal of intergovernmental mandates
found in the Occupational Safety and Health Act, the
revised draft recommended "no change."' 97 Despite these
and other substantial revisions, on July 23, 1996, ACIR
members voted thirteen to seven to reject the revised
report and recommendations. At that point, ACIR
executive director Bill Davis announced that the ACIR
would "very likely not go back to the drawing board," but
instead would seek direction from Congress on whether
to proceed.' 9 Congress responded by shutting down the
ACIR on September 30, 1996.299
D. THE UMRA BEGINS TO AFFECT THE LEGISLATIVE
PROCESS
The UMRA took effect on January 1, 1996.
Between January 1 and March 25, 1996, the CBO issued
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twenty-six state and local government impact estimates
and found five bills that contained public sector
mandates, though none of them exceeded the $50 million
threshold to raise an UMRA point-of-order.2"
According to Representative Rob Portman (R-Ohio), this
indicates that the Act is working as intended, because
mandate provisions are being excised before bills reach
the floor precisely to avoid point-of-order votes.2"' As an
example, he pointed to the Telecommunications Act of
1996, which initially included language to restrict the
ability of state and local governments to control public
rights-of-way held by cable companies. This restriction
would have constituted an unfunded mandate potentially
requiring a point-of-order vote because it would have
imposed unfunded regulatory burdens on local
governments in excess of $50 million. But the mandate
was removed from the bill before it ever reached the
House floor. Opponents of the mandate persuaded the
Commerce Committee to remove it from the bill, using
the UMRA point-of-order vote as leverage, 2 2 and the
Telecommunications Act was enacted without it.2" 3 This
episode suggests that the UMRA is not only informing
legislators about unfunded mandates in legislative
proposals, but is actually deterring them from enacting
new unfunded mandates.2 4
Although Congress did not consider any legislation
during the first half of 1996 that met the UMRA's $50
million threshold for a point-of-order vote, UMRA
procedures still figured prominently in committee and
floor debates on legislative proposals. For example, on
March 15, 1996, the House of Representatives debated
and voted on House Resolution 375 to waive all points-
of-order, including those under the UMRA, while it
considered the Foreign Relations Authorization Act.2
5
Some House members objected to waiving the UMRA
point-of-order, despite the fact that the CBO had
concluded that the Act under consideration would impose
no new intergovernmental mandates as defined by the
UMRA. The House ultimately voted to waive the UMRA
point-of-order, along with all other points-of-order.23 6
This episode suggests that Congress is quite sensitive
about unfunded mandates, playing close attention to
UMRA procedures even in cases where they clearly do
not apply.
Despite the fact that no legislative proposals in the
first half of 1996 met the UMRA's threshold $50 million
cost estimate, an UMRA point-of-order was raised on
March 28, 1996, to force a vote on a motion to recommit
the Contract With America Advancement Act of 1996.207
Representative David Bonior (D-Mich.) moved to
recommit the bill to the House Ways and Means
Committee with instructions to report the bill back to the
House floor with an amendment making a provision of
the proposed legislation contingent on raising the
minimum wage by a certain date. Bill Archer (R-Tex.)
immediately raised a point-of-order under the UMRA,
claiming that Bonior's motion to recommit included an
unfunded mandate,0 8 and that the CBO had determined
that raising the minimum wage would constitute an
intergovernmental mandate costing more than $50
million. However, the ranking minority member on the
House Rules Committee, John Moakley (D-Mass.),
quickly obtained a letter from the CBO certifying that
neither the motion to recommit nor the proposed
amendment would impose an intergovernmental mandate
as defined in the UMRA because neither action would
actually raise the minimum wage.2" To do that would
require additional legislation. Unfortunately, the CBO
letter arrived twenty minutes after debate on the measure
had ended and the parties had voted, mostly along party
lines, to support Representative Archer's point-of-
order.2"0
That did not stop Representative Moakley from
excoriating the House leadership's use of UMRA
procedures-the very first time they were applied on the
House floor-"to stifle debate. 2.. Moakley raised some
ominous implications from the episode:
There is no parliamentary or budgetary ruling
and there is no burden of proof on the member
raising the point-of-order. It does not matter if
the point-of-order is baseless, simply by raising
the point-of-order, the House is required to
vote on whether to consider the text that is
challenged. A simple majority of the House,
for any reason, regardless of whether there is
any legitimate financial imposition or not, can
deny the opportunity of a member to proceed
with an otherwise germane and viable
legislative measure. I raised the concern at that
time that this could be used both to stop
legislation not containing unfunded mandates
from being considered on the floor and as a
dilatory tactic to disrupt the legislative process.
I was always assured that this would not be
used for this purpose. Even then, however, I
did not anticipate that the very first use of this
tactic would be to deny the minority the right
to offer an entirely legitimate and germane
motion to recommit....
I am deeply troubled that if this practice
continues, it could simply become a backdoor
approach used to gag legitimate debate. . ..
The unfunded mandates law should be used as
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a tool to fix legislation that imposes unfair
financial burdens on state and local
governments and the private sector. It should
not be used as a weapon to prevent the
consideration of viable and responsible
legislation initiatives." 2
Representative Moakley's concerns were given
credence when the House Parliamentarian, Charles W.
Johnson, ruled that Representative Archer had "met the
'threshold burden to identify the specific language of the
motion' that would be an -unfunded mandate. 213 This
ruling seems to confirm that all a legislator needs to do to
stifle debate and force a vote is identify some specific
language in legislation that could constitute an unfunded
mandate.
Representative Moakley reiterated his concerns in a
March 29th letter to Representative Gerald Solomon (R-
N.Y.), Chair of the House Rules Committee."4 In
response, Representative Solomon suggested that it
seemed clear from the minority debate at the time that
Representative Bonior's motion to recommit included an
unfunded mandate. And, had the motion itself not
included an unfunded mandate, it surely would have
required the enactment of an unfunded mandate to further
the purposes of the Act under consideration. This, from
Representative Solomon's point of view, justified raising
an UMRA point of order against Representative Bonior's
motion to recommit the Contract With America
Advancement Act.2"5 Representative Moakley disagreed.
In a second letter, he reiterated that Representative
Bonior's motion to recommit contained no unfunded
mandate, so that the UMRA point of order technically
was inappropriate." 6 Chairman Solomon responded, this
time more constructively, by suggesting certain steps to
avoid the future misuse of UMRA points of order to delay
legislation or to block votes on legitimate amendments:
"Members offering amendments with potential
mandate implications" should "be prepared in
advance to defend against mandate points-of-order;"
Before offering such amendments or motions,
Members should present written copies, along with
evidence they do not include unfunded mandates, to
"avoid triggering unnecessary points of order that
otherwise must be raised defensively for lack of
adequate time or information to make an informed
judgment;"
"[W]hen an unfunded mandate point of order is
raised, Members on both sides" should "use the 20
minutes of debate allotted ... (to determine) whether
an unfunded mandate does exist;" and
"[T]he Leadership on both sides (should) impress on
their respective members, especially on . . .bill
managers, that the point of order should not be
raised for dilatory or frivolous purposes. 217
While Representative Solomon's recommendations,
on one hand, may help to avert future controversies over
the legitimate use of mandate points-of-order, they do not
ensure that points-of-order cannot be used by the majority
to stifle debate on proposed amendments and motions.
On the other hand, the episode illustrates Congress's
extreme sensitivity, at present, to the issue of unfunded
mandates. This may or may not suggest that the UMRA
is having the intended effect; it could just reflect the
current anti-federal mood of the country.
It is true that Congress did not enact a single new
unfunded intergovernmental mandate exceeding the $50
million threshold during the 104th Congress. However, it
is quite unlikely that the 104th Congress would
intentionally have enacted substantial new unfunded
mandates even if the UMRA did not exist. In short, it is
difficult (if not impossible) to separate out the legal
effects of the UMRA from the background political
pressures which led to its enactment and continue to
influence the legislative process. The UMRA does,
nevertheless, provide some security against unintentional
enactments of new unfunded mandates. That alone may
justify the statute's existence.
IV. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF
UNFUNDED FEDERAL MANDATES
As a case study of the legislative process, the story
of unfunded mandates reform is both troubling and
reassuring. It is troubling in that it confirms suspicions
that the legislative process is driven more by rhetoric and
(mis)perception than by fact and evidence. It is
reassuring in that it shows how even a faulty process can
lead to good, or at least benign, legislative ends.
Federal mandate reform was based on
unsubstantiated claims of "unfair" federal regulatory
burdens that supposedly were driving state and local
governments into "bankruptcy. 2 . As we saw in Section
I, the various state and local government surveys and
studies of the federal mandates "problem" all failed to
demonstrate that the federal government imposes net
costs on state and local governments. On the contrary,
the best available evidence indicates that state and local
governments receive a net (after mandates) federal
subsidy. Without other convincing reasons to either
reduce federal mandates or increase federal funding,"9
legislative reform was unjustified or, at least,
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unnecessary. This does not mean, however, that the
UMRA is a bad law.
The UMRA increases the information available for
legislative and administrative decisionmaking by
requiring cost estimates for new mandates, and it
enhances congressional accountability by requiring a
separate recorded vote to approve new legislative
mandates. These procedural requirements are useful,
though not cheap. All other things being equal, they
should improve the quality of legislative decisionmaking.
Perhaps even more importantly, the UMRA changes the
way administrative agencies do business. From now on,
when agencies propose rules containing mandates with
aggregate costs estimated at $100 million or more in any
one year, they must select the "least costly, most cost-
effective or least burdensome alternative," unless that
alternative is either contrary to law or demonstrably
inappropriate."'
Some critics complain that the UMRA does not go
far enough, however, in preventing Congress from
imposing new unfunded intergovernmental mandates.22" '
But that begs the question that we have tried to raise in
this article: Why should the federal government prevent
itself from imposing mandate costs on state and local
governments, so long as it continues to provide them with
a net subsidy? If there are sound arguments, beyond the
unsubstantiated claims of fiscal unfairness, the advocates
of federal mandate reform have not yet articulated
them.22
Finally, the fight over federal mandates reflects
fundamental questions about government policy and
intergovernmental relations. One side alleges that the
federal government has intruded too much on state
sovereignty.2 The other side counters that the attack on
unfunded federal mandates is really aimed at rolling back
environmental and social programs. 4 Both sides agree,
however, that all levels of government today confront real
and mounting fiscal pressures. The public continues to
demand a wide range of expensive government services,
but rejects tax increases to pay for them, and expects the
government to balance its budget. 5  The American
economy, meanwhile, cannot grow fast enough to permit
all three of these conditions to co-exist. Under the
circumstances, and especially in view of the increasing
pressure to reduce the federal budget deficit, the net
federal subsidy to state and local governments is likely to
decline, regardless of the Unfunded Mandates Reform
Act of 1995.
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